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 The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental 




In this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor 
governments (i.e., controlled by the same party) will receive more grants than those that 
are unaligned. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on grants 
received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from three different 
upper-tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). Since three elections 
were held at each tier during this period, we have enough within-municipality variation in 
partisan alignment to provide differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of 
alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source. Moreover, the fact that a 
municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors 
allows us to use a triple-differences estimator, which consists of estimating the effects of 
changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors 
relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones. The results suggest that 
partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by 
municipalities. 
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1. Introduction 
The traditional literature on fiscal federalism justifies the use of intergovernmental 
transfers on the grounds of efficiency and equity (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). 
According to this view, grants should be used to foster spending in spillover-generating 
services, to reduce the use of inefficient local taxes (Dahlby and Wilson, 1994) or to 
guarantee similar access to essential public services across the country (Buchanan, 1950). 
However, many scholars have recognised that what grantor governments ‘ought to do’ does 
not help much when explaining what they ‘actually do’. For example, Inman (1988) 
showed that the pattern of allocation of federal grants to the states in the US does not seem 
consistent with these normative prescriptions. 
Recently, many papers have appeared with the purpose of testing several hypotheses 
regarding the effects of political incentives on the allocation of grants. Some of these 
hypotheses are derived from electoral competition models. For example, according to 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1998), upper-layer governments 
should allocate more grants to states with a high proportion of voters who are not 
specifically attached to any of the parties (the so-called ‘swing voters’). The papers by Case 
(2001), Strömberg (2002), Johansson (2003) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2004) provide 
empirical evidence on the validity of this hypothesis. Some of these papers try to test this 
hypothesis against an alternative one (derived from Cox and McCubbins, 1986) that posits 
that, if politicians are risk averse, funds will be allocated to states where voters are clearly 
attached to the incumbent party (the ‘core supporters’). The results in Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2004), and Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005) suggest that the evidence in favour of 
this hypothesis is not compelling, although, as Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) suggest, the 
task of separating the ‘swing voter’ and ‘core supporter’ hypotheses is not easy. 
However, these approaches fail to answer a fundamental question: why should an 
upper-tier of government have an interest in delivering transfers to unaligned governments 
(i.e., controlled by opposition parties), which will surely try to use these funds to advance 
its electoral prospects (and, therefore, to harm those of the grantor government)? Of course, 
one may argue that these grants are generally earmarked for specific purposes and that the 
grantor invests in making clear to the citizens where the monies come from (e.g., by 
compulsory use of placards stating who the financial backer of the programme is).   3
Nonetheless, the crucial point here is that, even if the grantee can claim some small 
proportion of the credit gained from the grant, the grantor will still find it less profitable to 
allocate funds to unaligned than to aligned governments (Dasgupta et al., 2004). This 
suggests that local governments that are aligned with upper-tier grantor governments will 
receive more grants than those that are unaligned. Several papers
1 have tested this 
hypothesis, with most of them confirming that aligned states receive more funds than the 
unaligned ones. A common problem that can be found in most of these empirical exercises 
is the fact that they consider periods of unchanged partisan control at the upper layer of 
government (e.g. Grossman, 1994; Levitt and Snyder, 1995). This characteristic casts some 
doubt on the validity of the results, since the variable that measures alignment may be 
picking up other factors influencing the allocation of grants (e.g., greater needs in poor 
states controlled by the US Democratic Party).  
In this paper we test the alignment hypothesis with a rich Spanish database, which 
provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 
1992-2003 from three different upper-tier governments (Central,  Regional and Upper-
local). This database helps us to overcome data quality problems encountered by other 
authors in trying to test the alignment hypothesis. Firstly, in our database, there is cross-
section variation in the partisan control in two of the upper-layer governments (Regional 
and Upper-local). Secondly, since three elections were held at each tier during this period, 
we have enough within-municipality variation in partisan alignment (due to changes in 
partisan control at all layers of government) to provide differences-in-differences estimates 
of the effect of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source. The fact that a 
municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows 
us to use a triple-differences estimator, which consists of estimating the effects of changing 
alignment status on the change in grants coming from aligned grantors relative to the 
change in grants coming from unaligned ones. This estimator is more robust to the 
exclusion from the equation of economic and political determinants of the grants allocated 
by each upper-tier. The results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable effect on the 
amount of grants received by municipalities. 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Grossman (1994) and Levitt and Snyder (1995) for the USA, Worthington and Dollery 
(1998) for Australia, and Dasgupta et al. (2004) and Khemani (2003) for India.   4
The paper is organised as follows. In the second section we provide a simple electoral 
competition model that accounts for the different incentives that grantors have regarding 
aligned and unaligned local governments. The third section performs the empirical analysis. 
In this section we explain the different estimation procedures that we have been able to 
implement, the features of our database and the way we measure grants and alignment. This 
section ends with the presentation of the results. The fourth section sets out our 
conclusions. 
2. Theoretical model 
In this section we develop an electoral competition model with the only aim of 
providing a simple framework for our empirical exercise. The purpose of the model is to 
account for the incentives that grantors have regarding aligned vs. unaligned governments. 
The section is organised as follows. We first describe the basic setup of the model: the layers 
of government and parties analysed. Then we describe how a voter decides his vote, 
depending on the alignment between governments at different tiers. Then we describe both 
the objective of the upper layers of government (in terms of parties) and the results of the 
electoral game in terms of grants allocated to each local government. 
Basic setup 
In our model we have two upper-tier governments, each with a jurisdiction covering the 
entire country, and n+m municipalities. We will call the first tier U (Upper-local) and the 
second one R ( Regional). For illustrative purposes, we assume that each upper-tier 
government is controlled by a different party: the U government by the left-wing party (l) and 
the R government by the right-wing one (r). n municipalities are controlled by the r party and 
m by the l party. The parties r and l use the financial resources available at the layers of 
government they control to advance their electoral prospects
2. Although each party controls a 
different government tier, and different elections are held at each tier, we analyse a game in 
which they are competing in the same electoral race, without specifying which specific 
election we are talking about. We are, in fact, assuming that the politicians at all levels have 
                                                 
2 Note that the parties do not compete by promising transfer allocations as in more traditional, spatial 
voting settings (see, e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987), but by distributing real funds. In this sense, this 
setting more closely resembles models explaining the allocation of campaign efforts among districts 
(see, e.g., Snyder, 1989, and Strömberg, 2002).    5
an interest not only in winning the elections held at their levels, but also in advancing the 
prospects of the party in general. This may happen if campaigns are highly centralised, if the 
electoral results of a party in a given election and jurisdiction are influenced by the results 
obtained in other contests, or if winning elections helps the party in rewarding its supporters 
through the allocation of posts.  
Voting behaviour  
Voters cast their vote on the basis of two criteria: (i) the welfare generated by grants, 
) ( j j g u , with  ) ( '
j j g u >0 and  ) ( ' '
j j g u <0, and where R
j
U
j j g g g + =  are per capita grants in 
municipality j, coming from U and R, respectively; and (ii) ideology. We define  i X  as the 
ideological bias of voter i in favour of l; and  ) (X j Φ  is a municipality-specific distribution of 
X , with  = ) (X j φ   X X j ∂ Φ ∂ / ) ( , which is common knowledge.  ) (X j Φ  is assumed to be 
symmetric and single-picked. There is a stochastic component in voting behaviour which is a 
popularity shock,  j δ , in favour or against the party in the R and U governments. We assume 
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3.  
Now we assume that the voting decision of voter i depends on the alignment status of 
his local government. Following Dasgupta et al. (2004), we define θ  as the proportion of 
utility from grants attributed to the local government, and (1–θ ) as the proportion of utility 
from grants attributed to the grantor upper layer of government. If both layers are controlled 
by the same party, then all the utility from grants is captured by this party. If control is split 
between the two parties, then utility from grants must be shared. Thus, if the incumbent party 
at municipality j is r, i.e. j is aligned with R, voter i votes for party r if: 
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That is, expression (2a) says that if a municipality is aligned with R, all the utility coming 
from grants allocated by R is captured by the party r but, since the municipality is not aligned 
                                                 
3 The voter will vote for r if the welfare gain obtained from r during the last term of office relative to 
the gain obtained from l is higher than the ideological bias in favour of l: ∆uj
r-∆uj
l≥Xi. This welfare 
gain is hypothetical and should be interpreted as the increase in welfare caused by grants coming from 
the government controlled by party r compared to a hypothetical situation in which all the grants came 
from a government controlled by the other party. Only in this case does ∆uj
r-∆uj
l reduce to uj(gj
R)- 
uj(gj
U).   6
with U, also a proportion θ  of the grants allocated by U is captured by party r. Similarly, if 
the incumbent party at municipality j is l, i.e. municipality j is unaligned with R, voter i votes 
for party r if: 
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Party behaviour  
The objective of each party is to maximize the expected number of votes assuming the 
decision of the other party is fixed (i.e., Nash behavior) and subject to a fixed budget 
constraint. For example, in the case of party r, this can be expressed as: 
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where  j N  is the population of municipality j, and G
R and G
U are the exogenous amounts of 
resources available to the R and U upper-layer governments. The problem of party l can be 
stated in similar terms. 
Solution 
          The FOCs for the party r (upper layer of governments R) are :   
aligned (j=1,..,n):                                         R R
j j
a
j g u X λ φ = ) (   ) ( '                                         (5a) 
unaligned (k=1,..,m):                               R R
k k
u
k g u X λ θ φ = − ) 2 1 )( (   ) ( '                                  (5b) 
The FOCs for the party l (upper layer of governments U) are :   
 unaligned (j=1,..,n):                               U U
j j
a
j g u X λ θ φ = − ) 2 1 )( (   ) ( '                                  (5c) 
 aligned (k=1,..,m):                                       U U
k k
u
k g u X λ φ = ) (   ) ( '                                        (5d) 
The FOCs state that the marginal benefit of allocating grants to municipality j should be 
equal to the marginal cost of revenues. The marginal benefit is the product of three terms: (i) 
the density at the ‘cut-point’, or the proportion of ‘swing voters’; (ii) the marginal utility of 
grants; and (iii) in the case of unaligned governments, the transfer of utility to the other party 
due to unalignment,  ) 2 1 ( θ − . This term is lower than one, reducing the marginal benefit of 
allocating grants to this municipality.    7
Note that if θ >0.5 (i.e., if the grantee captures more benefits than the grantor), the 
marginal utility of grants becomes negative. In this case we will have a corner solution with 
zero grants allocated to unaligned municipalities. However, this seems to be an extreme case 
for at least two reasons. Firstly, if parties were not merely office-motivated but also pursuing 
efficiency and/or equity objectives, the marginal benefit of grants in (5) would include an 
additional term, making the corner solution more difficult (see, e.g, Dasgupta et al., 2004). 
Secondly, there must be an upper bound on the utility derived from grants that spills over to 
any opposition party. We assume that θ < 0.5, meaning that although the grantee may obtain 
substantial utility from projects funded by the grantor, the grantee never obtains more utility 
than the grantor. 
Effect of alignment on grant allocation 
The analysis of the FOCs allows us to make two different predictions about the effects 
of alignment status on the amount of grants allocated. The first prediction states that a grantor 
government allocates more funds to aligned municipalities than to unaligned ones. This 
hypothesis is obtained by comparing the two FOCs for the same grantor (either R or U). Look, 
for example, at the ratio between (5a) and (5b): 
                                                            1
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To isolate the effects of alignment from other influences, assume that  Φ Φ Φ k j = =  and 
u u u k j = = , meaning that both the shape of the distribution function and the utility function 
are the same in municipalities j and k. Let’s also assume, for the moment, that the popularity 
shock is zero (i.e., 0 = = k j δ δ ). These assumptions imply that the density at the cut-point is 
equal in both municipalities; thus, the ratio between the two densities is equal to one. In this 
scenario, given that θ<0.5, the denominator of the LHS of (6) is multiplied by a factor, (1-2θ), 
lower than one. Since 
' u >0 and 
' ' u <0, then  R
k
R
j g g >  is needed to rebalance expression (6). 
Hence, in this case the R upper-tier of government (controlled by r) clearly gives more monies 
to the j municipality (aligned with R) than to the k one (unaligned). In the case where the 
party governing R receives a negative popularity shock (i.e.  0 < = k j δ δ ), the density at the   8
cut-point is higher for the aligned municipality than for the unaligned one
4, so a further 
increase of  R
j g  (decrease of  R
k g ) is needed to rebalance expression (6), reinforcing the 
previous result. In contrast, when the party governing R receives a positive popularity shock, 
then the density at the cut-point is higher for the unaligned municipality. But in this case, the 
second effect could offset the former one, precluding any clear conclusion about the effect of 
alignment on grants. However, the magnitude of this second effect depends on the curvature 
of the density function: specifically, in this case,  R
k
R
j g g >  if ( ) ) ( ) ( 2 1 a
j
u
k X X φ φ θ > − .  
When  k j Φ Φ ≠  and/or  k j u u ≠ , the alignment effect may not hold because a 
municipality with a higher proportion of swing voters or with a higher spending valuation 
may receive more grants even if it is unaligned with the grantor. However, controlling for 
these variables, aligned municipalities could also receive more grants from a given grantor 
than unaligned ones could. Assuming that the vote-distribution functions for j  and  k are 
uniform on the intervals [ j j   ψ ψ 2 1 , 2 1 −]  and [ ] k k ψ ψ 2 1 , 2 1 − , respectively, this result can 
be illustrated by the following specific utility function: 
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where κ  and α are constants, with the latter measuring the concavity of the utility function; 
and  j b  is a parameter indicating that spending is more valuable to voters in some places. 
Substituting this function in (5a) and (5b), we obtain: 
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Whenever  () α α θ ψ ψ ) 2 1 ( ) ( − > k k j j b b , then  R
k
R
j g g > .  That is, the aligned municipality will 
receive more grants than the unaligned one. 
The second prediction says that a municipality receives more funds from an aligned 
grantor than from an unaligned one. This hypothesis is obtained by comparing the FOCs for 
the same municipality (j or k). Look, for example, at the ratio between (5a) and (5c): 
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4 In this case both cut-points are displaced to the left of the distribution function by the same 
magnitude. Since the departure point for k, Xk, is negative, the density at the cut-point is lower in k 
than in j, and the ratio is higher than one.   9
Let’s assume that  U R λ λ = . Since θ <0.5, the denominator of the LHS of (9) is multiplied by 
a factor that is lower than one. Given that  '
j u >0 and  ' '
j u <0, then  U
j
R
j g g >  is needed in order 
to rebalance expression (9). So, municipality j  receives more monies from the R grantor 
(aligned with municipality j) than from the U grantor (unaligned with j). When  U R λ λ ≠ , this 
result may not hold since the grantor with more resources may spend more in every 
municipality (aligned or unaligned) independently of their alignment. This result can be 
illustrated by using the same utility function as above. Substituting this function in (5a) and 
(5c), and summing over all municipalities and using the budget constraint, we obtain: 
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where  U R G G /  is the ratio between the exogenous amount of resources available to the 
grantors R and U, respectively. Controlling for the amount of resources at the disposal of R 
and U, if  () α α θ ) 2 1 ( ) ( − >
U R G G , then an aligned upper-tier government still allocates more 
grants to a given municipality than an unaligned one. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Background information on Spain 
Layers of government. Spain is a fiscally decentralized country with three layers of 
government: Central, Regional, and Local. There are seventeen regional governments, called 
Autonomous Communities (AC), which have quite important spending responsibilities, for 
example, in the provision of health care, education and welfare. Each AC is composed of one 
or more provinces. In the ACs with more than one province, there also exists an upper-tier of 
local government, called Diputación. This upper-tier of local government has fewer spending 
responsibilities than the municipalities, which are the main players in the local public sector. 
One of its pertinent tasks is allocating grants for capital infrastructure to the municipalities
5.  
Spain has over eight thousand municipalities, although most are quite small. 
Municipalities are multi-purpose governments, with major expenditure categories 
corresponding to the traditional responsibilities assigned to the local public sector 
(environmental services, urban planning, public transport, welfare, etc.), with the exception of 
                                                 
5 In ACs with only one province (there are six ACs of this kind), there is no Diputación, and its 
responsibilities are assumed by the regional government.    10
education, which is a responsibility of the regional government. Current spending is financed 
out of their own revenues (approx. 2/3) and unconditional grants (approx. 1/3), which are 
allocated according to a formula that hinders their use for pork-barrel politics. However, the 
funding of capital spending depends heavily on grants: in 2003, capital grants represented 
13% of non-financial revenues and 44% of capital spending. These grants come from the 
three aforementioned upper layers of government: Central  (15%),  Regional (45%) and 
Upper-local (21%)
6. Most of the grants take the form of ‘project grants’: there is an open call 
at regular intervals (usually yearly) and a municipality must apply by submitting several 
infrastructure projects, which are evaluated against criteria that have been previously 
establish-ed (probably published in the call) but are subject to the interpretation of the grantor. 
Therefore, the degree to which these grants are politically discretionary should be qualified as 
high. 
Elections and parties.  General elections are regularly held at four-year intervals, although 
they can be called before a term of office expires. Municipal and regional elections are held 
regularly every four years and on the same day in twelve out of seventeen ACs. In the period 
analyzed, they were called one or two years before general elections. In the other ACs, 
elections were called before an end of term and, therefore, were held on a different day. 
In the elections to central and regional legislative bodies, the provinces constitute the 
electoral districts, a differing number of representatives are elected in each province 
depending on its population, candidates appear on the parties’ closed lists, and the d’Hondt 
formula, with threshold, is used to translate votes into representatives (Colomer, 1995). 
Therefore, the system is not entirely proportional and, in fact, it is much easier to win a seat in 
some provinces (the rural ones) than in others. The system allows a certain degree of plurality 
in parliament, especially in the case of regional parties whose vote is concentrated in a few 
districts. Because of the closed-list system, parties are highly disciplined, both inside the 
legislatures and (to a minor extent) across layers of government. Since the party has a great 
influence on the future prospects of politicians (through the allocation of posts and of places 
in the lists), politicians are at least as  loyal to the party as they are  to their constituency. 
In municipal elections there are also closed lists, the number of city councillors depends 
on population, and the d’Hondt rule is again used, but in this case there is a single district. As 
                                                 
6 The remaining 18% corresponds to other sources (e.g., the EU) or to unspecified grants.   11
Colomer (1995) states: “these rules provide incentives for sincere voting and promote a high 
degree of pluralism in city councils”. As a result, there is a high proportion of coalition 
governments. For example, in the 1996-99 term, 43.3% of municipalities where governed by 
coalitions (Solé-Ollé, 2006). Most municipal candidates are aligned along national or regional 
party lines. The local political system is seen as a first step in the process of recruitment into 
the regional and national political elite (Magre, 1999). There are no specific elections to the 
assembly of the upper-tiers of local governments; the representatives of Diputaciones are 
elected as a product of the results of municipal elections. The votes for each party are 
aggregated across municipalities and are translated into representatives, again using the 
d’Hondt formula. These upper-tiers of government have been criticized on the grounds of 
reduced electoral accountability. With few clear-cut responsibilities and no need to go to the 
polls, politicians controlling this layer of government can use grants to foster party prospects 
at the next municipal election. 
The features of the Spanish electoral and party system described above mean that the 
elections held at each layer of government are not entirely independent of the national 
political situation. In fact, parties have a strong vested interest in the results of regional and 
municipal elections. Since these contests generally happen one or two years before general 
elections, they provide an excellent opportunity to test the real prospects of the party
7. 
Therefore, although most campaign efforts are regional or local in scope, the parties do design 
a centralized strategy for these contests. This strategy includes statements regarding which 
regions and municipalities deserve disproportionate campaign efforts
8, either because the 
perceived electoral margin is narrow or because the region or city is seen as having special 
significance in the eyes of voters (e.g., big cities). In the Spanish context, it is therefore 
natural to expect that just before an election, a party will use the various posts it controls at 
different layers of government to allocate grants to pursue its electoral objectives. The high 
                                                 
7 This is due to the fact that national political shocks do affect the results of these lower-tier elections.  
For evidence of this effect in Spain and in other countries, see e.g. Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005), and 
Rodden  et al. (2005), respectively. In fact, local electoral results are seen as predictors of party 
prospects for the next general election.  
8 One year before the future May 2007 municipal elections, the newspaper El País published a report 
on the prospects for this contest under the title, “PSOE and PP open the battle town by town”, which 
identified the regions and municipalities where each party will concentrate its efforts (source: El País, 
23th April 2006, p. 26: “PSOE y PP abren la batalla pueblo a pueblo”).   12
degree of partisan control exercised both within and across layers of government facilitates 
the use of resources coming from different posts for the fulfilment of party interests. 
3.2. Econometric framework 
Our econometric framework is built upon the results from the theoretical section. 
Since the Spanish case described above provides us with three upper-tier grantor governments 
(Central: C, Regional: R, and Upper-local: U) we can posit three equations, one for the grants 
allocated by each of these tiers: 
                              
C C C C
t j t j t j t j t j t j f f b a g , , , 3 , 2 , 1 , ,       ε β φ β β + + + + + = l l                                 (11a) 
                              
R
t j t j t j t j t j t j
R R R f f b a g , , , 3 , 2 , 1 , ,       ε β φ β β + + + + + = l l                                (11b) 
                              
U
t j t j t j t j t j t j
U U U f f b a g , , , 3 , 2 , 1 , , ε β φ β β + + + + + = l l                                    (11c) 
where 
C
t j g , ,l , 
R
t j g , ,l  and 
U
t j g , ,l  are per capita grants allocated by C,  R and U grantors, 
respectively, to municipality j, located in (national and regional) electoral district l, for the 
municipal term of office t. The effects of alignment are picked up by the dummies 
C
t j a , , 
R
t j a ,  
and 
U
t j a , , which are equal to one if municipality j is aligned with the C, R or U grantor for the 
term of office t. The terms t j,  φ  and  t j b ,    measure the effects of ‘swing voters’ (i.e., cut-point 
density) and needs/preferences (i.e., marginal utility of spending) respectively. We provide 
more details regarding how we measure these variables in the next section. In any case, since 
these effects will be difficult to measure, we should account for omitted political and 
economic influences through the inclusion of municipal effects,  j f . Moreover, we include 
electoral district × term-of-office effects, 
C
t f , l ,  R
t f , l  and  U
t f , l  . These effects account for the 
different amounts of resources available to different grantors in different terms of office, and 
for potential omitted political variables that change from district to district and from one 




t j, ε , 
R
t j, ε  and 
U
t j, ε  are well-behaved error terms. 
The database (explained below) allows us to exploit the cross-section and time-series 
variation across different upper-layers of grantor governments to deal with potential omitted-
variable problems and identify the effects of alignment on grant allocation. To illustrate the 
                                                 
9 The votes obtained in a municipality may be more valuable if the municipality is located in an 
electoral district where less votes are needed to gain a representative (because of lack of 
proportionality) (see, eg, Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005, for evidence).   13
advantages of our methodology, it is convenient to explain the four different procedures we 
use, step by step, from simplest to most complex. The first and third procedures are based on 
the proposition that a grantor will give more monies to aligned municipalities than to 
unaligned ones (expressions (6) and (8)). The second and fourth procedures are based on the 
proposition that a municipality will receive more monies from aligned grantors than from 
unaligned ones (expressions (9) and (10)). The first procedure, called cross-section, consists 
of using only the cross-section variation in the grants allocated by each grantor separately. 
Studies that do not have access to panel data or do not have information regarding different 
grantor governments must resort to this procedure. Let’s assume, for example, that we only 
have information on the grants distributed by R during one term of office:  
                                           R
j j j j j





j f ε η + = . 
If 0 ) ,   ( = R
j j
R a cov ε , we can obtain an unbiased estimate of  1 β  by controlling 
appropriately for  j φ  and  j b  and by including a full set of electoral district dummies,  R fl . In 
practice, however, it is not so straightforward. For example, if there is only one upper-layer 
government covering all the jurisdiction of the country (as often occurs in empirical analyses, 
e.g., Grossman, 1994), then  R
j a    will not only measure alignment but also differences in party 
control among municipalities. And, since party control is usually correlated with omitted 
socio-demographic variables (e.g., the left generally controls ‘poor’ municipalities, at least in 
Spain), the parameter  1 β will be biased unless the list of variables included in  j b  is 
exhaustive (i.e.,  0 ) , ( ≠ R
j j
R a   cov ε ). Similarly, R
j a    may be correlated with  j φ  if, for example, 
left governments tend to win by slim margins while the electoral advantage of right 
governments is substantial (or vice versa). Thus, this procedure is far from perfect. 
Nevertheless, we use it in our empirical exercise for two different reasons: firstly, to 
demonstrate the differences between this procedure and alternative ones (see below); and 
secondly, because in two of our upper-layer governments, the country is divided into several 
jurisdictions, and not all of them are controlled by the same party, attenuating the first of the 
problems mentioned above.  
The second procedure, called time differences-in-differences, consists of collecting data 
on the grants allocated by one grantor government in successive terms of office, to be able to 
estimate the effects of changes in alignment on changes in grants received. With this   14
information we will able to estimate equations (11a) to (11c) after taking first differences. As 
an example, in the case of the R government, we have: 
                                  R
t j t t j t j t j t j
R R R f b a g , , , 3 , 2 , 1 ,     ε β φ β β ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ l                              (13) 
where ∆ indicates that the variable has been computed as the difference in the values between 
two consecutive terms of office, and  1 β  is now the differences-in-differences estimator
10. The 
main advantage of this procedure is the attenuation of the omitted-variable problem, 
especially in the case of needs variables ( j b ), since some of them could reasonably be 
considered fixed (e.g., land area and other physical characteristics). Some electoral features 
( j φ ) might also be quite stable; however, others may change from one term of office to the 
next, and this change might be correlated with changes in alignment status ( R
t j a ,  ∆ ). Moreover, 
in some samples, the change in alignment may stem solely from a change in control at the 
municipal level. This may happen if control at the grantor level remains stable. In such case, 
the second procedure retains some of the problems of the first one. 
The third procedure, called grantor differences-in-differences, consists of using data 
on grants allocated to local governments by different upper-layer grantor governments in a 
given term. Subtracting expression (12) for two grantor governments, R and U, we have: 
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The 1 β parameter is the differences-in-differences estimator, obtained by using the same local 
governments as a control group, but supposing that they are in a different situation (i.e., 
receiving grants from an upper-layer government controlled by a different party).  
Since the grantor differences-in-differences estimator does not provide unbiased 
estimates of the alignment effect, we propose a fourth procedure, called triple-differences 
estimator, which uses panel data on grant allocation to local government by different upper-
layer governments in successive terms of office. The expression using the R and the U upper 
layers of government is: 
                                                 
10 In the differences-in-differences estimation, the standard errors are inconsistent if there is severe 
serial correlation. This is not so in our case, since none of the three characteristics that the literature 
points to as the source of this problem (a fairly long time series, a dependent variable that is highly 
positively correlated, and few changes in the control variable (alignment)) is present in our analysis; 
Bertrand et al. 2004). Thus, we will not make any correction on the standard errors obtained.    15
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In this case, the alignment effect is identified by a regression which uses as the dependent 
variable the difference between the grant increase (in two consecutive terms of office) of two 
grantor governments and, as explanatory variables, the change in alignment status vis-à-vis 
one grantor minus the change in alignment vis-à-vis the other. That is, if local government j 
switches from l to r after an election, the increase in grants received from R should be higher 
than the increase in grants received from U. This estimation should be more robust than the 
previous ones due to the omission of political and economic variables in the equation. 
Nonetheless, the good properties of this estimator depend on the validity of the assumption of 
equality of coefficients across equations, implicit in equations (11a) to (11c). There are some 
reasons to believe that this may not be the case. Firstly, as suggested by expression (10), the 
additional grants that a municipality may receive from an aligned grantor depend on the 
amount of resources distributed, so the β1 coefficients should be allowed to differ between 
equations. Secondly, different grantors may subsidise different types of projects, so a given 
variable included in  j b  may be weighted differently by each of them. Thirdly, since we have 
more than two parties, it may happen that the density at the cut-point  j φ  is no longer the same 
for all the parties. To account for these possible sources of bias, we include an additional set 
of controls in the estimation of equations (14) and (15). For example, the extended grantor 
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The coefficient of  ) (   U
j
R
j a a −  expresses the effect of alignment on grants received from the R 
grantor while the coefficient of  U
j a    allows us to test the equality of the coefficients of the two 
grantors. The triple-differences estimator is amended in a similar way with the inclusion of 
the same set of controls. After these modifications, the triple-differences estimator is expected 
to perform better than the other ones.  
 
3.3. Sample and data 
Selecting the sample. We estimate the effects of alignment on grant allocation, with data on 
Spanish municipalities. We use a rich database, which provides information on grants 
received by 869 local governments during the period 1993-2003, from three different upper-
tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). The data comes from a survey on   16
budget outlays conducted yearly by the Ministry of Economics and Finance. The starting 
number of municipalities is much bigger (2,799), but lack of data or the desired breakdown 
has necessitated reduction in the size of the sample. In the case of grants coming from the U 
government this number is further reduced to 755, due to the already mentioned fact that there 
are no Diputaciones in ACs with only one province. 
We estimate the effects of alignment for the three terms of office mentioned above. 
However, we use only the last two years of each term to perform our analysis. Thus, we set 
out to explain the effects of alignment on the overall amount of grants received in 1994-95 for 
the term 1991-95, in 1998-99 for the term 1996-99, and in 2002-03 for the term 2000-03. 
There are three reasons that justify this decision. The first one is the fact that it is quite 
difficult to identify alignment between layers of government given the different timing of 
general and (some) regional elections. Thus, the alternative procedure of aggregating grants 
over an entire local term of office would have encountered the problem of changing alignment 
in the middle of the period (since regional and general elections are held at some time 
between two local elections). The second reason is that by aggregating the grants variable 
over two years, we reduce the volatility of this variable. The third reason is that, as the 
political cycle literature has emphasised, the temptation to use public funds to buy votes 
increases as the next election approaches
11.  
Measuring grants. Our grants variables are capital grants (chapter 7 of the budget) coming 
from each upper layer of government (C, R and U). Grants are added up for the last two years 
of each term then divided by the population of the municipality at the beginning of these two-
year periods, using data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). We have considered 
that grants received during the election year benefit the incumbent government and not the 
incoming one. We believe that this assumption is reasonable, given that municipal elections 
are generally held in the middle of the year (May or June) and that grantor governments 
usually exhaust their yearly grants budgets early, just before the next election. 
Measuring alignment. The concept of alignment is straightforward in the case of single-
party governments. In this case, a municipality is said to be aligned with an upper-layer 
grantor government if the party controlling the government at both layers is the same. 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005) for evidence indicating that pork-barrel politics in Spain 
intensifies as the next election approaches.   17
However, in Spain a large share of governments (at all layers) are coalitions. Coalitions make 
the definition of alignment between layers more difficult. A party at a given layer of 
government may play at least three different roles: i) the single party in government, ii) the 
main partner or leader of a coalition, and iii) a mere partner of the leading party in a coalition. 
Paired combinations of these roles between a municipality and a higher layer of government 
define nine different relationship types, which are illustrated in Table 1.  
(Insert Table 1) 
The amount of grants transferred to municipalities belonging to each of these types 
depends on two different factors. Firstly, as it has been explained in the theoretical section, it 
depends on the credit lost by the grantor government. If both layers are controlled by the same 
single party, there is no credit loss, but if this party is the leader of a municipal coalition, part 
of the credit will flow to its local partner(s). If this party is only a partner at the municipal 
level, the party leading the municipal coalition may get a large share of the credit. These 
considerations do not seem to depend on the status of the upper layer, so grant levels should 
decrease as we move from left to the right in Table 1. Secondly, it depends on the ability of 
the upper layer of government to secure a large share of the funds available to be distributed. 
Of course, a single-party government is able to use the entire grants budget as it wishes, 
without having to share it with other parties. But we need to rely on coalition theory to answer 
which of the other two types is more able to obtain funds. Some papers suggest that a 
coalition leader or formateur (i.e., the party charged with the task of forming the coalition) is 
able to secure a larger share of benefits than other coalition members (Baron and Ferejohn, 
1989). However, other papers suggest that the ability to obtain benefits for the party will be 
greater when it can pivot between alternative, minimum-winning coalitions (Schofield, 1976, 
Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2004; see Rodden and Wilkinson, 2004 for empirical evidence). 
This clearly means that strong coalition partners will receive more grants than weak ones. 
Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that strong partners will be able to control more funds than a 
coalition leader. Moreover, we have not been able to identify whether coalition partners are 
pivotal or not in all the cases, so our sample of Partners mixes both pivotal parties and 
weaker ones. Therefore, we still expect that coalition leaders are able to control more funds 
than coalition partners.    18
The use of such a high number of categories in the empirical analysis is not operative, 
since most of them are empty or have a very small share of municipalities. For this reason, we 
have decided to use only four groups (see Table 1), defined as follow: (a) Single party: the 
same party controls a single-party government at both layers; (b)  Leader: a party which 
controls a single-party government at one layer and leads a coalition at the other layer; (c) 
Municipal partner: a party belonging to the upper layer of government (either the single 
party, the leader of a coalition or a mere partner) and is merely a partner in a municipal 
coalition; and (d) Upper-layer partner: a party which is a partner at the upper layer and either 
the single party or the leader of a coalition at the municipal level. We expect to find the 
highest grants in (a) because the effects of the loss of credit and of the capacity to secure 
funds go in the same direction. The lowest grants are expected in (c), meaning that the loss of 
credit effect dominates. As we have said before, we expect more grants in (b) than in (d) 
since, given a similar ability to gain credit, single parties and coalition leaders will be able to 
secure more funds, unless very powerful pivotal parties predominate. In the empirical analysis 
we also provide results for the (a+b) category, with the argument that this definition fits better 
with the concept of party alignment, since its computation only uses the identity of the main 
party of the government.  
To compute these measures of alignment, we use a database provided by the Spanish 
Ministry of Public Administration, which gives information about the party of the mayoralty 
and (in the case of coalitions) the other parties in the municipal governments, following the 
local elections of 1991, 1995 and 1999. For the upper tier of local government, this database 
provides information regarding the party of the president and the composition of the 
assembly. Data on the party of the president of the AC and the other parties in the regional 
and national governments come from www.eleweb.com. In all cases, minority governments 
have been considered as coalitions. The party of the president or the mayor has been 
considered the Leader and the other parties belonging to the coalition, the Partners. 
Our alignment measures have some properties that make them quite appropriate for the 
empirical analysis we wish to perform. First of all, for each of the upper layers of government 
and in each term of office, a large share of municipalities are unaligned. This share goes from 
a minimum of 24.1% for the Regional government in the third term to 57.0% for the Central 
government during the same term (2000-03). Aligned governments are concentrated in the (a)   19
and (b) categories. Secondly, a large share of municipalities changed alignment status from 
one term of office to the next. The share of municipalities which changed their alignment 
status with the Central, Regional and Upper-local layers from 1994-95 to 1998-99, were 
70.7%, 69% and 59.6%, respectively. These shares were around 45% in all three cases for the 
transition from 1998-99 to 2002-03.  
Measuring ‘cut-point’ density.  The theoretical model suggests that the equations should 
include a measure of the ‘cut-point density’, φj, or proportion of ‘swing voters’. To make this 
variable operative we need to decide first which electoral data (Central,  Regional  or 
Municipal) are to be used to compute it. We decided to use only voting data from the last 
municipal elections. There are several arguments that justify this decision. Firstly, it is not 
advisable to include a separate measure for each of the elections, since the three would be 
highly correlated
12. Secondly, one of the grantor governments (Upper-local) has a vested 
interest in these elections since its representatives are elected indirectly using the municipal 
voting results (see section 3.1). Thirdly, our grants variable is an average of the grants 
received by a municipality two years prior to municipal elections, when the vested interest of 
the parties will be to win the coming elections.  
Most of the papers in the literature use the electoral margin of the party (i.e., vote share 
less 50%, in absolute value) at the last election as a proxy for φj (Case, 2001, and Strömberg, 
2001, Dasgupta et al. 2004, and Kehmani, 2003)
13. However, the electoral margin may be a 
misleading measure in the case of more than two parties. When none of these parties wins a 
majority of the votes in the municipal election, winning or losing office and taking the best 
posts (i.e., the mayoralty and the greatest number of councillors) depend crucially on the 
probability of being the leader, or formateur, of the coalition. The party winning a larger share 
of votes is generally able to carry out this task. This is true in our sample, since the most 
voted party holds the mayoralty in the vast majority of cases
14. In this case, therefore, the 
                                                 
12 For example, the correlation coefficient between the vote share of the socialist party (PSOE) at the 
General and Regional elections (using the data of the Regional election prior to the General one) at 
the provincial level is 0.92. The correlation between the General and Municipal elections is 0.81 and 
the correlation between the Regional and Municipal elections is 0.83. 
13 Other papers use more sophisticated measures. For example, Johansson (2003) and Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2004) estimate a vote density function for each municipality and then compute the ‘cut-
point’ density. The data requirements of this procedure make it not useful in our case. 
14 Of course, we can find examples of Spanish municipalities where the mayoralty is taken by a pivotal 
party, or even where two parties with similar vote shares agree to alternate the mayoralty (the two first 
years of the term for one party and the last two for the other). However, these cases represent a rather 
small share and can be safely disregarded in the empirical analysis.   20
relevant electoral margin should be computed as the difference (in absolute value) between 
the vote share of the party in government and the vote share of the next party, having either 
more or fewer votes (Jonston et al., 1999). This is precisely the variable we include in the 
equation. 
Control variables. We include some variables that measure the marginal valuation of 
spending bj (see Table 2 for definitions, data sources and descriptive statistics). Firstly, we 
control for the population size of the municipality. In Spain, current grants are clearly biased 
against small municipalities (Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2005) and capital grants are biased against 
big municipalities. There are several explanations for this pattern. It may be that small 
municipalities find it harder to finance infrastructure projects either with current savings or 
through access to the credit market. It may also be that the upper layers are paternalistic 
toward small municipalities, allocating project grants that must be supervised by the grantor, 
instead of unconditional current grants. We expect, therefore, that per capita grants will 
decrease as population size increases. Secondly, we control for the land area of the 
municipality to account for the increasing expenditure needs generated by urban sprawl. We 
expect this variable to have a positive effect on the amount of grants. Assessed property 
values are included to account for the fiscal capacity of the municipality since, in some cases, 
the grantor use equalization criteria when allocating grants. The property tax rate is included 
because sometimes the grantor gives more monies to the municipalities which make a higher 
fiscal effort fiscal effort. We expect that, once we control for tax capacity, grants should be 
higher in municipalities with higher tax rates. Finally, we include the ratio between debt 
burden and current revenues. There may be two different factors at work here. On the one 
hand, grantors may want to give more money to more indebted municipalities, providing 
some sort of bailout (Wildasin, 2004). But on the other hand, most of the grants allocated are 
project grants funded only partially by the grantor. Therefore, a municipality with a high level 
of debt may also find it difficult to obtain funds to pay for its share of the cost. 
(Insert Table 2) 
3.4 Results 
Single party + Leader alignment. Tables 3 and 4 present the results when using the Single 
party + Leader alignment dummy (categories a + b). Table 3 presents the results of the first 
two estimation procedures (i.e., (i) Cross-section and (ii) Time differences-in-differences)   21
while Table 4 presents the results of the last two procedures (i.e., (iii) Grantor differences-in-
differences and (iv) Triple differences). In all cases, a full set of provincial dummies (cross-
sectional methods (i) and (iii)) or term-provincial dummies (panel methods (ii) and (iv)) have 
been included; at the bottom of the table we include a test showing that they are significant. 
The explanatory performance of the equations is reasonable, with an adjusted R
2 between 0.3 
and 0.4 in the cross-section cases and around 0.2 in the panel cases. In all cases, the full set of 
variables is statistically significant. 
(Insert Tables 3 and 4) 
The results obtained suggest that partisan alignment between a municipality and a grantor 
government has a statistically significant impact on the grants allocated by the grantor to the 
municipality. This conclusion does not actually depend on the increasing robustness checks 
which are imposed when going from method (i) to methods (ii), (iii) and (iv).  Alignment has 
a statistically significant effect at the 95% level in all cases, with the exception of the Central 
government case in methods (i) Cross-section, where the coefficient is not statistically 
significant, and (iii) Grantor differences-in-differences, where the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 90% level when comparing the Central and the Regional governments. In 
method (ii) Time differences-in-differences, this coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90% level for the Regional government. 
There are two regularities in the results that are worth mentioning. First of all, the 
alignment coefficient of the Regional government is higher than those of the other layers in 
all cases. This result may be due to the fact that total grants distributed by Regional 
governments are much higher than those distributed by Central or Upper-local ones. Of 
course, it may also be due to a differing ability to control for other influences in each of the 
three cases. However, this result also holds in methods (iii) and (iv) where we allow for a 
different alignment coefficient for each layer while controlling for municipality-specific 
shocks which are common to all the grantors. In these two cases, the coefficient on ∆Single 
party + Leader identifies the effect of alignment on the grants received from the first-named 
grantor (i.e., the Central government in the first column of Table 4), while the coefficient on 
Single party + Leader identifies the difference between coefficients (i.e., in the first column 
of Table 4, the alignment effect vis-à-vis the Central government less the alignment effect 
vis-à-vis the Regional one). This second coefficient is negative in three regressions (i.e., the   22
Regional government gives 11 and 7 euros more per capita to aligned municipalities than the 
Central government, and 10 and 7 euros more than the Upper-local one). The Central and 
Upper-local governments give the same amount of grants to aligned municipalities. This is to 
be expected, since the amount of resources at these two layers differs little. These results 
suggest that it is necessary to augment methods (iii) and (iv) using the full set of controls. The 
results without these controls are qualitatively similar (alignment coefficients are still positive 
and significant) but different in magnitude.  
Secondly, the coefficients obtained with methods (i) and (iv) are lower than those 
obtained with methods (ii) and (iii). Putting aside the results obtained with method (i), which 
should be the least reliable, this means that the use of method (iv) Triple differences has some 
influence on the estimated magnitude of the alignment effect. However, even when using the 
estimates coming from this method, the alignment effect appears to be sizeable. The results 
show that a municipality aligned with Central,  Regional and Upper-local grantors will 
receive additional grants of 5.1, 12 and 5.7 euros per capita, respectively. These amounts 
represent 31.9%, 24.9% and 25.02%, respectively, of the average per capita grants distributed 
by these layers of government. 
To conclude this section, we comment on the results for the control variables. Firstly, 
when using methods (i) and (ii), the electoral margin variable has the expected negative sign 
but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels in the vast majority of cases. This 
variable is statistically significant only in the case of the Central government and when using 
method (i) Cross-section, which is the least reliable. The point estimate implies that a 10% 
reduction in the electoral margin with respect to the next party implies an increase in grants of 
3.66 euros (22.9% of the average grants received from the Central government). The 
coefficient estimates for the other layers of government are lower, but are not discussed here 
because the higher standard errors make them unreliable. The coefficient of the margin is zero 
when using methods (iii) and (iv) meaning that ‘cut-point’ density has a similar effect on 
grants allocated by all layers of government. The inability to obtain significant negative 
effects for the margin variable is a little disappointing, but it is in accordance with the 
literature (see, e.g.; Kehmani, 2003; and Rodden and Wilkinson, 2004). There may be various 
reasons for this. Firstly, the perceived margin may have shifted since the previous election; 
more sophisticated methods of calculation (see, e.g., Dahlberg and Johansson, 2004) might   23
solve this problem. Secondly, the theoretical model posited here may not be the only one 
possible and other theories may lead to different relationships between margin and grants. For 
instance, as Cox and McCubbins (1986) suggest, if politicians are risk averse, they will 
allocate more resources to safe districts than to marginal ones, and more funds to marginal 
districts than to already lost ones. To account for this possibility, we reestimate our equations 
by including interactions between the margin variable with a set of dummies identifying safe 
and marginal municipalities. We define a ‘safe’ municipality as one with a positive margin 
greater than 15% (sample average + one standard deviation), a ‘marginal’ municipality as one 
with a margin (positive or negative) lower than 15% (in absolute value), and an ‘already lost’ 
municipality as one with a negative margin lower than -15%. Admittedly, these thresholds are 
rather arbitrary, but they have been selected after some trials as the ones providing the best fit. 
The results (not reported but available upon request) confirm our expectations. For Regional 
and  Upper-local governments, the margin has a negative slope only for ‘already lost’ 
municipalities, the slope is zero for ‘marginal’ municipalities, and it is positive for ‘safe’ 
municipalities, although the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Thus, the grants-margin 
function seems to be asymmetric, with a lower margin increasing grants when negative and 
reducing them when positive. For the Central government, however, the grants-margin 
function has the traditional U-inverted shape. But the most important aspect for our purposes 
is that this new way to specify the ‘cut-point’ density variable does not qualitatively change 
the results regarding the alignment status dummies. 
In addition, the results regarding the remaining control variables are also consistent with 
expectations. When using methods (i) and (ii), we find that more populated municipalities 
receive lower per capita grants. The population coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant for the three grantor governments, but the effect is lower in the case of the Central 
government. Grants also grow with the urban land area of a municipality, except in the case of 
the  Central  government. The three upper-layer governments also allocate more grants to 
municipalities with low fiscal capacity (low assessed property values), although the 
coefficient of this variable is much lower in the case of the Central government. A higher 
fiscal effort (high property tax rate) also obtains more grants from the three grantor 
governments, but the effect is much higher in the case of Upper-local grants. Finally, the 
effect of the debt burden is negative in all the cases, but it is statistically significant only in   24
one case. Most of these variables are not statistically significant when using the (iii) and (iv) 
methods. In some cases only, the coefficients identify significant differences in the weight 
given by the different grantors to each variable. For example, the results suggest that an 
Upper-local grantor gives more weight to the fiscal capacity indicator than a Regional one, 
and that a Regional grantor gives more weight to that variable than a Central grantor. 
Full set of alignment categories.  Tables 5 and 6 present the results using the full set of 
alignment categories (a to d). These tables are organized in the same way as those discussed 
before. The only two differences are that four alignment dummies appear instead of one, and 
that the results regarding the control variables are not shown so as to save space. In the case 
of the a dummy (i.e. party alignment between two single parties), the results are more or less 
the same as before. In this case, all the coefficients are statistically significant at 95%, with 
the exception of the Central  government case in method (i) Cross-section, where the 
coefficient is significant at the 90% level. The results are similar in the case of the b dummy 
(i.e. alignment when the party is the leader of a coalition in one or both of the layers). The 
coefficient is always statistically significant at 95% when using grantor differences methods 
(iii) and (iv). The effects of the c dummy (i.e. alignment between an upper-layer single-party 
or leader government and a municipal coalition partner) are always positive but only 
statistically significant at 90% in two cases (Central and Upper-layer in method (ii)). In the 
case of the d dummy (i.e. party alignment between an upper-layer partner and a municipal 
single-party or leader government), the coefficient is statistically significant (although 
sometimes at the 90% level) in most cases (the exceptions are the Regional case in method (ii) 
and the Central case in method (iii)).  
(Insert Tables 5 and 6)  
Therefore, we can conclude that there is strong evidence that upper-layer governments 
allocate more grants when a municipality is aligned, in the sense that both layers are 
controlled by the same party and that this party is either the single party in government or the 
leader of a coalition. There is no evidence that partners at municipal coalitions receive more 
grants, with the (iv) method clearly rejecting this proposition. There is evidence that partners 
in upper-layer coalitions are able to secure more grants for their municipalities. In this case, 
the coefficients obtained with the Triple-differences method are statistically significant. Using 
these results, the coefficients can be expressed as a percentage of the grants distributed by   25
each grantor government. The results of this calculation show that, in the case of Single-party 
alignment (a), the increase in grants due to alignment is 45.6%, 37.3% and 47.5% for the 
Central,  Regional and Upper-local governments, respectively. In the case of Leader 
alignment (b), these numbers are 26.2%, 25.39% and 24.7%, respectively. The results for the 
Upper-layer partner case (d) show increases in grants of 34.0%, 31.0% and 33.1%. In any 
case, these results are in line with expectations:  the alignment effect is stronger in single-
party governments but it is also present in the other cases, with the exception of Municipal 
partner alignment. Upper-layer partner alignment effects are not stronger than Single-party 
effects but are at least as strong as Leader alignment effects. Recalling that our Upper-layer 
partners include both pivotal parties and weaker partners, our estimates should be taken as a 
floor for the effect of pivotal parties, which may be even higher. In future work, we will try to 
disentangle both categories to be able to obtain more precise estimates of the pivotal-party 
effect. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have tested the hypothesis that political alignment affects the 
distribution of grants among municipalities. We have developed a simple electoral 
competition model between parties controlling different layers, which suggests that: (i) a 
given grantor government gives more monies to aligned municipalities, and (ii) a given 
municipality receives more monies from the grantor(s) with which it is aligned. These two 
propositions form the basis of the empirical procedures we have used to test the alignment 
hypothesis. Our database has provided information on grants received by nearly 900 Spanish 
local governments during the period 1993-2003 from three upper-tier governments (i.e., 
Central,  Regional  and  Upper-local) and allowed us to use several alternative estimation 
procedures. The first proposition has been tested with a cross-section estimation for the 
average of the period. However, since three elections were held at each tier during this 
period, we have enough within-municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide 
differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants 
coming from each source; this is the procedure used to test the second proposition. In 
addition the availability of panel data has allowed us to use a triple-differences estimator, 
which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants 
coming from aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from unaligned ones.    26
The results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable effect on the amount of grants 
received by municipalities. The effect is much stronger when the aligned governments are 
single-party governments at both layers. There is also a significant effect when the party at 
one or both layers is the leader of a coalition, and when a single party or a party leading a 
coalition at the municipal level is also partner of a coalition at the upper level. However, 
parties which are mere partners at the municipal level do not seem to get more grants from 
upper tiers of governments controlled by the same party. The size of the alignment effect is 
also notable; in the single-party case, aligned municipalities receive over 40% more grants 
than unaligned ones. Moreover, since it is possible for a municipality to become aligned/ 
unaligned with all the upper-layer grantors, there will be some municipalities that receive an 
overall amount of grants 40% higher than others. In other cases, however, alignment with one 
layer will offset unalignment with the other. 
These results pose new questions for the researcher. For instance, if voters are rational, 
they may choose at local elections to vote for the party in charge at the upper layer in order to 
avoid becoming unaligned, thus protecting grant monies. In this scenario, a party winning 
office at the general and regional elections (only when they are held prior to municipal ones) 
would see its vote share increase at the municipal elections. The testing of this hypothesis 
will form part of our future work. 
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Table 1: 
A typology of alignment status 
  Municipality 
  Single 
party  Leader  Partner 
Single 
party  a   














Partner  d   




Table 2:  
Definitions of the variables, Descriptive Statistics and Data sources 
 Definition  Mean 
(Stand. dev.) Source 
Central grants 
Capital grants from the Central 





Capital grants from the Regional 
government (AC) per capita (item 7.5 




Capital grants from Upper-local 
governments per capita (item 7.6.1 of 





Debt service (capital, item 9 of the 
spending budget, + interest, item 3) as 
a share of current revenues 
0.241 
(0.844) 
Ministry of Economics 
and Finance 
Margin 
Vote share of the party in government 
- vote share second party, in absolute 
value 
Ministry of Interior & 




Population  Population  
   
28,834 
(129,826) 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
Land area 
Urban land area per capita, including 




Property value/pop.  Assessed property value per capita  17,975 
(15,160) 
Property tax rate  Nominal property tax rate (IBI), % of 
assessed property value 
Central Land 
Management Registry 
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Table 3:  
Effects of Single party + Leader alignment (a+b) on grants allocated to  
municipalities. Cross-section and Time differences-in-differences estimation. 
  (i) Cross-section  (ii) Time differences-in-differences 
 Central  Regional  Upper-local  Central  Regional  Upper-local 
Single party + Leader  




























































































































2  0.435 0.398  0.301  0.191 0.199  0.165 














No Obs.  1,738 1,738  1,540  1,738 1,738  1,540 
Notes: (1) t statistics are shown in brackets; (2) *&**=significantly different from zero at the 90% and 95% levels; (3) 
Provincial dummies included in the Cross-section equations, and Time x provincial dummies included in Time differences-
in-differences equations; (4) Cross-section estimation uses the average of periods 1994-95, 1998-99 and 2002-03. 
Table 4:  
Effects of Single party + Leader alignment (a+b) on grants allocated to  
municipalities. Grantor differences-in-differences and Triple-differences estimation. 
  (iii) Grantor differences-in-differences  (iv) Triple differences 











– Central  
∆Single party + Leader 



















Single party + Leader 













































































































2  0.324 0.311  0.296 0.185  0.184 0.234 














No Obs.  1,738 1,540  1,540 1,738  1,738 1,738 
Notes:  (1) t statistics are shown in brackets; (2) *&**=significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels; (3) 
Provincial dummies included in the Grantor differences-in-differences equations, and Time x provincial dummies included in the 
triple-differences equations; (4) Grantor differences-in-differences estimation uses the average of periods 1994-95, 1998-99 and 
2002-03. (5) ∆Single party + Leader alignment (a + b) identifies the effect of alignment on the grants received from the first-
named grantor (i.e. Central government in the first column). (6) Single party +  Leader alignment ( a + b) identifies the 
differences between coefficients (i.e. in the first column, the alignment effect vis-à-vis the Central government less the alignment 
effect vis-à-vis the Regional one)   30
Table 5:  
Effects of alignment (a to d) on grants allocated to municipalities. 
Cross-section and Time differences-in-differences estimation. 
  (i) Cross-section  (ii) Time differences-in-differences 
 Central  Regional  Upper-local  Central  Regional  Upper-local 

































































2  0.420 0.399  0.310  0.192  0.199  0.169 














No Obs.  1,738 1,738  1,540  1,738  1,738  1,540 
   Notes:  (1) See Table 3; (2) Same controls as in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 6:  
Grantor differences-in-differences and Triple-differences estimation. 
  (iii) Grantor differences-in-differences  (iv) Triple differences 











– Central  


































































2  0.339 0.322 0.281  0.199  0.201 0.242 












No Obs.  1,738 1,540 1,540  1,738  1,540 1,540 
  Notes:  (1) See Table 4; (2) Same controls as in Table 4. 
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